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COMMENTARY
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS*
VICTOR H. KRAMER**
A prime American ideal is, with important exceptions, that competi-
tion, not government regulation, should be the determinant-the
regulator of market forces. To most of us it appears obvious that the
ideal is becoming increasingly weakened by the forces of reality. Pri-
vate business monopoly, tariffs, government subsidies, and, above all,
regulation by government commissions have increasingly acted as sub-
stitutes for competition. Since Americans will not permit private mo-
nopoly to act as the market determinant, unchecked or unsupervised
by government, it seems clear that increased economic concentration
will result in increasing government regulation. This trend poses a ma-
jor dilemma: in many industries competition has not worked as the de-
terminant of market forces, and government regulation is not working
either.
In the balance of these remarks, I propose to review current
definitions of monopolization, including some of the newer definitions
advanced in the law books and by the Antitrust Division, but not yet
adopted by the courts. Then I shall outline the leading proposal for
legislative reform of the law of monopolization and venture some per-
sonal doubts and questions on the wisdom of the legislation. Next, I
shall consider some of the reasons why the Sherman Act has not suc-
ceeded in dissolving what has been perceived by many to be excessive
or undesirable economic concentration. I shall conclude with some
suggestions for a somewhat more workable deconcentration policy for
America.
* The text of this Commentary was first presented as an address to the Metro-
politan St. Louis Bar Association, Feb. 14, 1975.
* * Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Public Interest Representation,
Georgetown University Law Center. LL.B., 1938, Yale University.
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I
It is hornbook law that section 2 of the Sherman Act defines three
separate offenses: single firm monopolization, single firm attempt to
monopolize, and multi-firm combination or conspiracy to monopolize.'
There is an intriguing theory that a single firm that results from an
amalgamation of competing firms having the requisite market power
is a combination to monopolize, as long as the combination continues
to exist. The failure of this theory to persuade courts to order dissolu-
tion does not warrant extended discussion.2 We should note also that
section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain kinds of corporate acquisi-
tions if the effect may be to tend toward a monopoly. In United States
v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,3 the Supreme Court held that an
acquisition by du Pont of General Motors' capital stock, which prob-
ably had the effect of tending toward monopoly, remained unlawful
even though many years had passed since the acquisition was made.
In considering the concentration problem, therefore, we can not ignore
the impact of section 7 on corporate acquisitions, even those made sixty
years ago when the Clayton Act was enacted. This is particularly
important because the usual remedy for section 7 violations is divestiture
of the legally acquired stock or assets.
The opinion of Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp.4 contains the best judicial review of the law on monopoly,
even though the opinion is now over twenty years old. Recounting
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa),5 Judge Wyzanski stated that
an enterprise had "monopolized" if, regardless of its intent, it had
achieved [control of a market by acts that] were not economically in-
evitable, but were rather the result of the firm's free choice of business
policies.6
This definition, which was expressly approved by the Supreme Court
in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,7 requires first a determina-
1. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1946).
2. See, e.g., United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md.), petition
for dissolution denied, 234 F. 1019 (D. Md. 1916). For discussion, see text accompany-
ig notes 28-30 infra.
3. 353 U.S. 586, 596-607 (1957).
4. 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-45 (D. Mass.), affd per ciiriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1953).
5. 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
6. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass.
1953).
7. 328 U.S. 781, 814 (1946).
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dion of the appropriate market, then a calculation of the share the puta-
tive monopolist controls in that market, and finally an analysis of how
the firm obtained that share.
Definition of the appropriate market is not easy in that it does not
lend itself to any brief, pithy, verbal formula. The concept is a flex-
ible one and may require economic studies of cross-elasticity of de-
mand, thus involving an elaborate investigation of customer behavior
in the alleged market."
On the issue of market control, Judge Hand found that Alcoa, doing
ninety percent of the business in an appropriate market, had control and
then said, "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be
enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not."9 Notice that he did
not use the round number sixty-five percent.
The third ingredient of the offense of monopolization is more subtle
and elusive. Some have said the third ingredient requires proof of an
"element of 'deliberateness.' "10 According to Judge Wyzanski, Justice
Douglas' position in United States v. Griffith" was that "it is a violation
of § 2 for one having effective control of the market to use, or plan
to use, any exclusionary practice .. ."12 Attempts to define the
phrase "exclusionary practice" suggest Justice Stewart's comment about
obscenity: he couldn't define it but he knows it when he sees it. Judge
Wyzanski suggested that Justice Douglas may have meant to go further
and adopt the Hand approach, which was that one who acquires an
overwhelming share of the market "monopolizes whenever he does
business,' 3 unless the putative monopolist can show that he owes his
position solely to his superior skill, better products, natural advantages,
patents on his own inventions, and the like.' 4
Although there are doubtless some monopolies that are not the result
of monopolizing, that is to say, not the result of a deliberate effort to
gain or maintain market control, my view is that the superior skill de-
8. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
9. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. See REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITEE TO STUDY THE
AN-rrmusT LAws 55 (1955).
11. 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948).
12. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953).
13. Id., citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d
Cir. 1945).
14. 110 F. Supp. at 342.
Vol. 1975:165]
Washington University Open Scholarship
168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
fense will rarely be a winner for anything other than the pocketbooks
of the antitrust defense lawyers who endeavor to prove it. I doubt also
that a defense based on the assertion that the Government has errone-
ously defined the market will be successful very often, though that. de-
fense did save du Pont in the Cellophane Case.Yr IBM hopes the de-
fense will succeed in the current trial of the Government's allegations
that IBM monopolizes the business of general purpose digital com-
puters.10 In my opinion, any single manufacturer supplying two thirds
or more of the national output of any identifiable product is probably
(though not certainly) violating section 2.
If I am correct in this view, Western Electric has no defense on the
merits in the recently filed section 2 case against it and AT&T.17 It
would do well to rely on the 1956 consent decree as a defense, and,
if it loses on that, it had better talk about infeasibility and loss of ef-
ficiency if the Government's prayer for relief in the case were to be
adopted. In fact, that seems to be the strategy of AT&T, if I correctly
interpret its current public relations campaign. In his November 26,
1974, letter to shareholders, AT&T's board chairman, John D. Debutts,
said:
[Wie have made no secret of our conviction that the public interest is
not served by the introduction of competition in a business that owes
its progress. . . to the principle of undivided responsibility for service
to the public.
After making that astounding admission, how the company can hope
to defend on the ground that Western Electric has not monopolized
eludes me.
To summarize: section 2 of the Sherman Act appears to be an ade-
quate tool for exposing single-firm monopolists to court-ordered relief.
(In a moment we shall consider the efficacy of the antitrust laws, once
liability is established, in restoring competition to monopolized mar-
kets.) Section 7 of the Clayton Act is probably adequate to deal with
any corporation that possesses significant market power, though less
than the power required to exclude all competitors. The provisos must
15. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
16. United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., Civil No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 16, 1969); see BNA ANrn usT & TRmE REG. REP. No. 677, at A-13 (Aug.
20, 1974).
17. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed
Nov. 20, 1974); see BNA ArrrnusT & TRADERFG. RE . No. 690, at AA-1, D-1 (Nov.
26, 1974).
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be added that the significant market power has to have been achieved
by acquisition of another corporation's capital stock (if the acquisition
occurred between 1914 and 1950) or as a result either of corporate
stock or asset acquisitions subsequent to 1950 when the Clayton Act
was amended to prohibit certain asset acquisitions.
H
Let us now consider why the antitrust laws are widely regarded as
insufficient to deal with the problem of concentration in American in-
dustry. Preliminarily, I should note that there are many reasonable
people in America who do not believe that new legislation is needed
to deal with deconcentration. These Americans appear to fall within
one of three groups. One group says that "the only purpose of antitrust
law is to promote efficiency"' 8 and the dominant producers in many
concentrated industries are more efficient. Thus, this group does not
think economic concentration is a serious problem. A second group
believes that concentration is a problem that can be dealt with under
existing, judicially approved theories. The third thinks it is a serious
problem that should be dealt with by pervasive government interven-
tion, including government regulation of wages and prices.19 Readers
who share any of these points of view need not read further because,
to them, nothing I shall say hereafter could possibly be sensible.
Although, to repeat, section 2 appears adequate to deal with the
single-firm monopolist, most concentrated industries are dominated by
two, three, or four firms. Economists label such concentrations
"oligopolies," sometimes more felicitously labeled "shared monopolies."
Writing in 1969, Professor Donald Turner stated that he had changed
his mind and no longer believed new legislation was required to dissipate
the power of shared monopolists. He said:
Where oligopolists sharing monopoly power have engaged in restrictive
conduct lacking any substantial justification, they may appropriately be
said to have unlawfully attempted to monopolize. Where it appears that
their decisions to carry on particular exclusionary practices are interde-
18. See, e.g., Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Cm. L.
REV. 506, 507 (1974); Policy Director Questions FTC Priorities; Urges Reform of
Agency Policies, Programs, BNA ANTrrusT & TRADE REo. REP. No. 692, at A-10, A-
11 (Dec. 10, 1974). The Policy Director's (Mr. Liebeler) views are contained in FTC
OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNiNr AND EVALUATION 1976 BUDGET OvwRYvEw, reprinted in part
in BNA ANTITRusT & TunDE REG. REP. No. 692, at E-1 to E-13 (Dec. 10, 1974).
19. See, e.g., J. GALBRArH, ECONOMICS AND TrE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973).
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pendent, where one would not have carried on the practice unless the
others had gone along, they may also be charged with a conspiracy or
combination to monopolize. Finally, where each of the companies effec-
tively sharing monopoly power has engaged in possibly justifiable con-
duct that nevertheless has unnecessary exclusionary effects, it seems
logical and appropriate to me to charge each with having individually
"monopolized" in violation of section 2. Each has obtained and main-
tained monopoly power-real, though shared-to which factors other
than skill, foresight, industry, and the like have contributed. 20
The Antitrust Division's pending cases against Goodyear and Fire-
stone apparently represent an effort to test the Turner doctrine.21
These cases allege that each company has attempted to monopolize the
replacement tire market. Each is charged with having used, independ-
ently of the other, similar methods to suppress competition. Specifi-
cally, Goodyear and Firestone are said to have lowered their prices to
drive out competition and to have arranged tire, battery, and accessories
sales plans with oil companies for the same purpose. Moreover, the
complaints charge that each of the defendants has purchased competing
tire manufacturers as well as wholesalers and retailers of replacement
tires. The prayer asks for the divestitures necessary to dissipate the
effects of the violations alleged. Until these cases are decided by the
Supreme Court, one cannot be sure that new legislation is necessary
to deal with the problem of oligopoly, if, that is, one believes that
oligopoly is a problem.
Senator Hart and other senators and representatives apparently believe
that amendment of the Sherman Act is required if an effective anti-
monopoly policy is to be implemented. The so-called Hart bill, or
Industrial Reorganization Act, would establish an industrial commission
and an industrial court to handle the oligopoly problem.2 2 The com-
20. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
H v. L. Rnv. 1207, 1230-31 (1969). For a critical analysis, see Cooper, Attempts and
Monopolization, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373, 409-18 (1974).
21. United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Civil No. C-73-836 (N.D. Ohio,
filed Aug. 9, 1973); United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civil No. C-73-835
(N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 9, 1973). For explanation of the complaints in these cases, see
lustice Charges Goodyear and Firestone with Attempted Monopolization and Illegal Ac-
quisitions, BNA ANrnusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 626, at A-1, D-1 (Aug. 14, 1973);
5 CC I TRADE REG. REP. 1 45,073, at 53,539 (1975).
22. S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bill], reprinted in
H. GoLDscmAmr, H. MANN, & J. WESTON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRAbON: Trm NEw
LEARNING 444 (1974) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSCHI-mT], reprinted in part in 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 50,166 (1973).
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mission to be established would be charged with devising means of
eliminating industrial concentration. It would give top priority to reor-
ganizing seven industries: chemicals and drugs, electric computing and
communication equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, energy,
steel, autos, and nonferrous metals.23 The bill provides that there
shall be a rebuttable presumption of monopoly power if any one
of three conditions is present in an industry: First, if the average rate
of return of any corporation is in excess of fifteen percent of net worth
for five consecutive years; secondly, if there has been no substantial price
competition among two or more corporations in any line of commerce
for three consecutive years; thirdly, if four or fewer corporations in any
line of commerce account for fifty percent or more of sales in any year.24
If one or more of these conditions are found to obtain, reorganization
is to be achieved through the Industrial Commission's prosecution of
members of concentrated industries before the new Industrial Court.
Moreover, there is another part of the Hart bill that is very signifi-
cant. Section 2 of the Sherman Act has been rather consistently inter-
preted to provide that two or more corporations are guilty of conspiring
to monopolize commerce if through consensual action they achieve and
maintain the power to exclude competitors or to fix prices. Consensual
action means some sort of agreement or understanding. The other part
of the Hart bill proposes, in effect, to add the offense of possessing
monopoly power to the offenses already created by section 2.25 No
evidence that two or more corporations have agreed on anything is nec-
essary to prove the offense. Thus, the bill declares it to be unlawful
for "two or more corporations, whether by agreement or not, to possess
monopoly power.126  The word "monopolize' was not defined in the
original Sherman Act, and "monopoly power" is not directly defined
in the Hart bill. As I have already noted, however, those industrial
characteristics sought to be prevented are defined in the bill in the
terms creating a rebuttable presumption that the offense has occurred.
For those who believe that the degree of concentration in some U.S.
industries warrants reform, this portion of the Hart bill may offer a rea-
sonably acceptable solution. The mood in Congress for vigorous anti-
monopoly action seems strong. A proposal to enact this portion of a
23. Bill § 203.
24. Id. § 101(b).
25. Id. § 101(a); see GOLDSCHMmiDT 340ff.
26. Bill § 101(a).
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revised Hart bill, as an amendment to section 2, might capture that
mood. By making it clear that proof of an agreement is not necessary
to proof of the offense, the amendments, in effect, would redefine con-
spiracy or combination to monopolize to eliminate the requirement that
there be proof of consensual action. Thus, in a sense, the amendment
would substitute the economist's definition of combination to monop-
olize for the lawyer's.
The economist looks at economic performance. For example, if new
entrants are foreclosed from entering the tire manufacturing business,
it makes no difference to the economist that each of three corporations
produces twenty-five or thirty percent of all replacement tires and does
so without agreeing on anything with the other two. To the lawyer,
however, it makes all the difference in the world because, so far, section
2 of the Sherman Act has not been interpreted to prohibit control by a
single firm of less than sixty-five percent of a market, absent either a
specific purpose to gain control of the market or consensual arrange-
ments with competitors to eliminate competition.
If only this portion of the Hart bill were enacted, however, it would
not hit at the central problem of relief. The courts would still be left
with the problem of providing a remedy to destroy or at least to limit
the power of the adjudicated oligopoly. This is where the remainder
of the Hart bill might work a revolution by substituting for the Anti-
trust Division and the federal district courts a commission and a special-
ized court with a mandate to reorganize concentrated industries.
Though I find the problem agonizing and the answers far from clear,
I think I would vote against this part of the Hart bill. In the first place,
the regulatory commissions, on the whole, simply have not worked as
intended. For one thing, they take too long to do their work. For
another, traditionally they have not insulated themselves from the in-
dustries they regulate; accordingly, they are subject to intellectual cor-
ruption. So are some federal judges, to be sure, but my observation
is that most federal judges are able to insulate themselves from the un-
seemly pressures placed upon the commissioners. Certainly, most
federal judges manage to project a greater air of detachment.
A second category of objections to the Hart bill arises from what
might be called its statistical Procrustean bed. If I may mix three
27. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Commission Bills Supported by Broad Public, Pri.
vate Spectrum, BNA ANmiuhsT & ThADE REo. REP. No. 690, at A-17 (Nov. 26, 1974).
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metaphors, by placing statistical triggers on the deconcentration gun, the
bill gives a good reason to fear that concentrated corporations would
pull their competitive punches in order to avoid the firing squad. Of
course, the statistics only give rise to rebuttable presumptions of
monopoly power-but the presumptions are there nonetheless.
Lastly, there is a more subtle objection. The very generality of the
Sherman Act gives wide room for the exercise of that indefinable
quality we call judgment; to some degree, the Hart bill would remove
room for the exercise of judgment and would substitute statistics. This
approach arises out of desperation about the seeming inability of either
the law-enforcing establishment or the judiciary to come to grips with
the monopoly problem. Although our judiciary generally has not failed
to recognize a monopolist when it has seen one, judges and the Attor-
ney General have shrunk from their task of proposing, adopting, and
imposing effective relief upon adjudicated monopolists.
I
Writing in 1916 in the first United States v. American Can Co.
antitrust case, Judge Rose in Baltimore found that the company was
a combination in restraint of trade in the production and sale of tin
Cans.28 In one sentence, the judge foreshadowed at least one impor-
tant reason why section 2 has not worked as a weapon against indus-
trial concentration. He said: "I am frankly reluctant to destroy as
finely adjusted an industrial machine. ... 19 He declined to order
that the company be dissolved, but in a subsequent opinion retained
jurisdiction with leave to the government to seek dissolution or other
relief if future developments warranted.30
Judge Rose's opinions in American Can have been neglected by anti-
trust legal scholars; they are instructive, however. He opened his first
opinion by noting that the defendant had called 516 witnesses, the gov-
ernment, 346, that over 1,500 exhibits were filed, and that the record
covered more than 8,700 printed pages. Judge Rose then said:
"Nevertheless, an ordinary collision case on the admiralty side of the
court. . . would raise more issues of fact."31 Little has changed in
28. 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916).
29. Id. at 903.
30. United States v. American Can Co., 234 F. 1019, 1022 (D. Md. 1916).
31. 230 F. at 860-61.
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the past sixty years. Antitrust prosecutors continue to confuse monop-
oly power with its exercise and fear that district judges can only be
persuaded to grant effective relief if they are angered at the abuse of
the power. Therefore, the prosecutors throw into the record every doc-
ument that may persuade the trial court of the defendant's wickedness.
And counsel for the defense follow the same tactic in reverse.
Ever since 1892, when the president of National Cash Register wrote
in a company publication that "[w]e do not buy out [opposition]; we
knock out,""2 government trustbusters have hoped to find the equiv-
alent of the Comstock Lode in defendants' files. When will they learn
that the true Comstock Lode is to be found in Learned Hand's opinion
in Alcoa and in subsequent opinions in monopolization cases in the Su-
preme Court? I cannot resist pointing out that the famous National
Cash Register memorandum resulted in a prison sentence for its author.
On appeal the sentence was reversed by a court perhaps grateful for
the author's intervening charity in helping Dayton, Ohio, recover from
the terrible flood of 1913. Moreover, the Government's subsequent
civil case seeking dissolution was settled by consent decree containing
only injunctive relief.33
We are now witnessing massive efforts by the Antitrust Division and
AT&T to discover documents in the files of the other. The Govern-
ment's discovery seems designed, in part at least, to prove the obvious.
One of the Government's requests is for all documents since January
2, 1930, regarding suggestions or directions to the Bell companies to
purchase equipment from Western Electric. The Bell System has over
eighty percent of the telephone market; thus, there can be hardly a doubt
that the Government makes out a prima facie case of monopolization of
equipment when it establishes that Western supplies the Bell System
members with all their telephone equipment needs. Indeed, as I men-
tioned earlier, AT&T has virtually admitted, not to say boasted, that
Western Electric has a monopoly of the manufacture of telephone
equipment. Yet Government lawyers are engaged in a massive effort
to prove the obvious, instead of relying on a relatively few interroga-
tories to AT&T, the answers to which would accomplish the same
objective.
32. Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 633 (6th Cir. 1915), quoting National
Cash Register Co., internal publication (May 1, 1892).
33. See CCH TRADE REG. REP., Ct. Dec. Supp. I1, 3130.
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Since Government lawyers are not stupid, I presume that their pur-
pose is to obtain documents from the defendants that would imply or
express the Bell System's evil intent, particularly following the entry of
the consent decree almost twenty years ago. As I read the law of
monopoly, evil intent is irrelevant.
Here again the old American Can case is instructive. Judge Rose
took only forty pages to review the mass of evidence in that case. He
began the section of his opinion containing his conclusions with the fol-
lowing statement:
One who sells only one-half of the cans that are sold does not, of
course, possess a monopoly in the same sense as he would if he sold all
of them or nearly all of them. Yet he may have more power over the
industry than it is well for any one concern to possess ...
. . . [Olne of the designs of the framers of the Anti-Trust Act was to
prevent the concentration in a few hands of control over great industries.
They preferred a social and industrial state in which there should be
many independent producers. Size and power are themselves facts
some of whose consequences do not depend upon the way in which they
were created or in which they are used.34
Yet, for reasons already noted, 5 the judge balked at ordering dissolu-
tion.
It is not just judges who have deep-seated doubts that the answer
lies in horizontal dissolution of adjudicated monopolists. No court has
ordered wholesale dissolution-breakups--of adjudicated monopolists
in major industries since 1916 when Judge Hand ordered dissolution
34. 230 F. at 901 (D. Md. 1916). Compare the statement of Judge Hand in the
Alcoa case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945):
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system
of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and char-
acter, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direc-
tion of a few.
35. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
36. In the same month, June 1916, that Judge Rose finally refused to dissolve the
Can Company, Judge Hand ordered that Corn Products Refining Company be dissolved
pursuant to a plan to "be filed with the Federal Trade Commission as master in chanc-
ery, under section seven of the Federal Trade Commission Act." United States v. Corn
Prod. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). The FTC never got the case be-
cause Corn Products, after dismissing its appeal to the Supreme Court, Corn Prod. Ref.
Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 621 (1919), consented to a decree requiring it to sell
two of its glucose mills. See 2 S. Wi-iNEY, ANzrxUST PoLiciEs 262-63 (1958). For
a description of subsequent antitrust developments in the can industry and an evaluation
of their economic impact and results, see id. at 201-26.
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in United States v. Corn Products Refining Co. 7 There have been re-
peated divestitures in section 2 cases, with some even by consent; how-
ever, there has been no divestiture by a monopolist of a major industry
comparable to the split-up of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
trusts. Perhaps it is poignant to some trustbusters today to note that
we are still grappling with the antitrust problems of the petroleum in-
dustry. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that today we have about
twenty major oil companies rather than one Standard Oil trust.
Until recently at least, with the possible exception of the days of the
great depression, Americans generally have admired business, and big
business in particular. It has given us, or at least two-thirds of us, those
things we seem to want: cars, television sets, touch-tone dialing, auto-
matic washers and driers, frostfree refrigerators, and leisure time.
Big business is mysterious to most of us; each of us works in such a
limited part of the total industrial process that we marvel at how
the process meshes to produce the ultimate consumer goods. These
facts and others give rise to the fear that dissolution might kill the goose
that has laid so many golden eggs. The writing of most federal dis-
trict judges reflects this fear. Who am I, they say, to tell a successful
businessman how he must reorganize the business he heads. Judge
Wyzanski said it most clearly in his United Shoe Machinery opinion in
refusing to dissolve that company:
[A] trial judge is only one man, and should move with caution and
humility.
. . . In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded . . . an
authority they have in no other branch of enacted law. . . . They
would not have been. . . allowed to keep such authority. . . if courts
were in the habit of proceeding with the surgical ruthlessness that might
commend itself. . . to those aiming at immediate realization of the so-
cial, political, and economic advantages of dispersal of power.88
37. 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919); see note
36 supra. Extensive vertical divestitures have been ordered. See, e.g., United States V.
E.T. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (separation of manufacturer of automo-
tive supplies [du Pont] from its principal customer [General Motors]); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (separation of distributor from exhibitor
of motion pictures). Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1919),
with United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), and United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 52 (1953).
See generally Note, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistic
Size, 40 COLUM. L. Rnv. 615 (1940).
38. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass.
1953).
[Vol. 1975:165
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/12
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
Let me cite two examples from my personal experience in the Justice
Department. Former Attorney General Brownell and I publicly dis-
agreed about the wisdom of the 1956 consent decree ending the suit
to divest Western Electric from AT&T.39 Mr. Brownell did not believe
that the Sherman Act's mandate for dissolution of monopolies made
sense as applied to AT&T and Western. For reasons never entirely
clear to me, he thought those laws did make sense as applied to United
Fruit's alleged monopolization of the banana business. United Fruit
ended up consenting to some divestiture, 40 and I am told the result was
lower banana prices. The national attitude toward deconcentration is
mirrored in no small part by the two incidents I have just recounted.
We are not of one mind and within each of us divestiture and dissolu-
tion of adjudicated monopolists sometimes does not appear to be worth
the risks.
IV
Having said all this, it does not follow that we should junk dissolution
as a remedy for concentration. It means simply that that remedy is
not going to be widely used to restructure American industry or even
that portion of it perceived by the majority of people as being too con-
centrated for comfort. What, then, are the remedies? First of all, sec-
tion 7 should be vigorously applied to prevent or undo all acquisitions
likely to lessen competition or to lead toward monopoly. Despite the
Supreme Court opinion last year in United States v. General Dynamics,41
it is my judgment that the present Court stands ready to continue to
apply section 7, as Congress intended, to stop any tendency to
monopolize where that tendency results from corporate stock or asset ac-
quisitions. The Government defeats last year in the two section 7
banking cases represent to me a veiled admonition to the Division to
cease excessive preoccupation with competition in those markets Con-
gress in its wisdom--or lack of it, if you prefer-has chosen to subject
to extensive regulation, including regulation of entry.42
39. See J. GOULDEN, MONOPOLY 100-01 (1968).
40. See United States v. Un'ted Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 73,790 (E.D. La. 1958);
Fruit Company Seeks Court Approval of Divestiture, BNA ANTmTRuST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 587. at A-15 (Nov. 7, 1972).
41. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
42. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United
States v. Connecticut Nat'I Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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Secondly, the cases against Firestone and Goodyear 43 should be
vigorously pushed to the Supreme Court to test the legal theories on
which the complaints are founded.
Thirdly, the Antitrust Division should be bold in its prosecutions.
Assistant Attorney General Kauper deserves our respect and admira-
tion for his courage in filing the antitrust suit against AT&T.44 The
acquisitions of coal companies by oil companies in the late sixties were
inexplicitly unchallenged under section 7 by then Assistant Attorney
General Turner.45 Those acquisitions should be reexamined in the
light of the energy crisis and subsequent judicial opinions, 40 and suits
seeking divestiture should be instituted where appropriate. This Con-
gress contains many new members who will support a much more
aggressive attack on the monopoly problem. While the discussion of
section 7 in President Ford's October five-point antitrust program did
not mention the AT&T action, I do not believe President Ford plans a
fate for Tom Kauper similar to the exile of Dick McLaren threatened by
former President Nixon.47
Senator Kennedy has introduced a bill to require General Motors to
confine itself to the manufacture of vehicles for one mode of transpor-
tation, presumably automobiles, and divest itself of the others, including
buses and locomotives. 41 General Motors defends against this proposal
by arguing that its buses and its locomotives are better and that it has
done nothing wrong." It seems to me that this defense misses the
mark. The bill is based on an objection to the power of GM over al-
ternative modes of transportation, not on its abuse of that power. Un-
less the Division is estopped by its prior dismissal and settlement of
43. See note 21 supra.
44. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed
Nov. 20, 1974).
45. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Turner to Senator Morse, March
31, 1967, reprinted in BNA ANsrr TusT & TtADE REG. REP. No. 303, at A-11 (May 2,
1967) (concerning the acquisition by Continental Oil Co. of Consolidation Coal Co.).
See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
46. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 909 (1974).
47. See House Evidence Shows Nixon Ordered ITT Appeal Dropped, Threatened to
Fire Antitrust Chief McLaren, BNA ANrrrausr & TRADE Run. REP. No. 674, at A-26
to A-27 (July 23, 1974).
48. S. 4131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
49. See Kennedy Sponsors Bill to Force GM Divestiture of Bus, Rail Facilities,
BNA ANTITRsT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 685, at A-23, A-24 (Oct. 22, 1974).
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cases against GM, 0 it should seriously consider beating Senator
Kennedy to the punch by filing suit under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts to get GM out of the business of manufacturing buses and locomo-
tives on the theory that a concern that dominates production of automo-
biles has too much incentive to thwart or warp the development and
sale of machines necessary for alternate modes of transportation. That
GM has a monopoly of locomotives and buses seems almost obvious;
let GM carry the burden in court of proving that it owes that monopoly
solely to its own superior skill and foresight. In a recent fascinating
article, economics professor Williamson argues that the mere fact that
a corporation such as GM may have achieved its original dominance
in locomotives solely through superior skill is not the decisive ques-
tion. 1 Rather, he suggests that before deciding that the corporation
has not unlawfully monopolized, the court must determine that the cor-
poration's superior skill has continued down to the time of suit and that
the defendant owes its current monopoly position solely to the present
exercise of superior skill.5 2 In brief, Professor Williamson can be said
to be arguing for a what-did-you-do-for-me-lately approach to the
superior skill defense. I think he is right.
Fourthly, and most important, our government should get out of
the business of promoting concentration. The regulatory agencies,
as Tom Kauper recently said so well, have
often pursued the common goals of restricting competition by means of
price regulation, entry regulations, technology control and service quality
limitations. . . . [We] can no longer afford . . . such wasteful govern-
ment practices. . . . The need for elimination of economic waste is
too urgent [to wait for the report of yet another government commis-
sion]. . . . We need change now.53
The American automobile industry, which has always favored free
international trade, is a prime example of the benefits of foreign com-
petition in American markets. Volkswagen and other foreign car manu-
facturers introduced more competition in the market in a few years than
decades of Sherman Act enforcement had been able to achieve.54
50. See Hart Committee Hears Auto Industry Break-Up Proposals, BNA ANwrrruST
& TRADE REG. REP. No. 653, at A-14, A-15 (Mar. 5, 1974).
51. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Con-
siderations, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1526-27 (1972).
52. Id.
53. Regulatory Reform Commission Bills Supported by Broad Public, Private Spec-
trum, supra note 27, at A-20 (Nov. 26, 1974).
54. See 1971 AUTOMOTivE NEWS ALMANAC 25.
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Lastly, President Ford's October 1974 speech announcing that he
would require that "all major legislative proposals, regulations and rules
include an inflation impact statement that certifies we have carefully
weighed their effect on inflation ' 55 should be vigorously implemented.
The word "competition' should be substituted for "inflation" in his
statement, and he should issue an executive order requiring adherence
to his pronouncement. 56 Moreover, he should appoint an ombudsman
with the power and prestige to see that it is carried out. Congress
should require the so-called independent regulatory commissions to
publish their own competitive impact statements prior to adopting anti-
competitive regulations. I believe the courts would be hospitable to
suits by public interest groups praying for injunctions against govern-
ment actions not preceded by competitive impact statements required
by an executive order.
V
Despite the demise of competition in much of the economy, we still
adhere to the free competitive market as the American ideal. Until
now the facts that the ideal was never attained, that it was riddled with
exceptions, and even that the laws striving to make the ideal more
nearly a reality were not rigorously enforced, have not been thought
to be causes for abandoning the Sherman Act or the ideals behind it.
Nevertheless, when the realities and the ideals of a society are anti-
thetical, the ideals become suspect. Either the ideals change or the
laws change. Normally, this is gradual. Under some circumstances,
not altogether understood by historians, revolution results. I sug-
gest that, whether by revolution or by lawful process, the next two
years mark a turning point. Antitrust will be abandoned unless the
present Administration, or that to come in 1977, and the Congress
demand more pervasive antitrust enforcement and give the anti-
trust agencies all the support they need. In addition, the Office of the
President must take the lead in reviewing the activities of the executive
establishment so that those programs and proposed programs that en-
courage market concentration may be curbed.
55. The speech is reported in full in The Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1974, § A, at
10, col. 1.
56. See Kramer, Toward a More Effective Antimonopoly Program, 23 AM. U.L.
REV. 615, 624 (1974).
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